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INCREASED TRAFFIC AS MEETING THE SPECIAL
DAMAGES REQUIREMENT FOR AGGRIEVED
PARTY STANDING
In Joseph v. Township of Grand Blanc,1 the township board
amended a zoning ordinance to allow the construction of a commercial
building. Plaintiff, an owner of a residence located one mile from the
rezoned property, brought suit in a Michigan trial court to enjoin the
ordinance from taking effect and to have it declared null and void.
In his complaint, plaintiff alleged "... . that because of this rezoning,
traffic will be increased on the dirt road fronting his property; because
of this, he has suffered economic and esthetic losses."2 Upon defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that since
plaintiff's property was located one mile from the rezoned property,
and since he did not allege any special damage, plaintiff was not an
aggrieved party and could not maintain the action. On appeal, the
Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the increase in
traffic, ".... with its attendant difficulties for property owners whose
property fronts on the street, are matters which address themselves
to the police authorities of the municipality rather than to the zoning
authorities." s It thus held that plaintiff suffered no substantial dam-
age, was not an aggrieved party, and could not challenge the ordi-
nance. This case, then, squarely presents the issue of who has standing
to challenge a zoning regulation, and it is with this issue that this com-
ment is concerned.
Changes in zoning regulations may be accomplished either through
legislative rezonings or through administrative determinations by the
board of zoning appeal. All jurisdictions provide methods for the
judicial review of administrative zoning decisions, and the majority
confer a right of appeal on "any person aggrieved" by such a decision.4
1. 5 Mich. App. 566, 147 N.W.2d 458 (1967).
2. Id. at 568, 147 N.W.2d at 460.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE art. 8, app. B at 207-08
(Tent. Draft No. 1, April 24, 1968); CAL. CIV. PRO. CoDE ANN. § 1067 (Deer-
ing 1959); CoLo. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-5 (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 176.16
(1966); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 5.2940 (1958); N.Y. VIL.AGE LAW § 179(b) (Mc-
Kinney 1966).
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As this term is rarely defined by legislation, the courts must be relied
upon to determine who is and who is not sufficiently "aggrieved"
within the terms of the statute. The enabling acts do not provide a
statutory appeal from legislative rezonings, but the courts adopt an
identical approach in determining who is entitled to injunctive relief
from a rezoning ordinance.5
One of the most helpful pronouncements on standing to appeal is
contained in a recent Maryland decisions involving a rezoning:
In zoning cases, the rule ... is that for a person to be aggrieved...
the decision must not only affect a matter in which the protestant
has a specific interest or property right but his interests therein
must be such that he is personally and specifically affected in a
way different from that suffered by the public generally7
This statement of the rule reflects the general judicial understanding.
Under it, courts have held that absent a showing of "special damages"
a party will not be heard to challenge a zoning regulation." Neverthe-
less, the problem of standing should not be reduced to a mere mechan-
ical application of a formula.9 All too frequently the special damage
rule is applied by a court without clear analysis, simply as a tool to
deny relief. Unfortunately, the ambiguities latent in the statement of
the special damages rule allow the courts to escape a closer analysis of
the standing problem.
I. THE PROXIMITY REQUIREMENT
Certain situations presented to the courts permit a relatively simple
determination of the existence or nonexistence of special damages.
5. For cases on this point, see Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A
Challenge to the Established Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U.
PA. L. REv. 56, n. 23 (1965).
6. DuBay v. Crane, 240 Md. 180, 213 A.2d 487 (1965).
7. Id. at 185, 213 A.2d at 493.
8. Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Co., 106 Conn. 475, 138 A. 483 (1927); Michi-
gan-Lake Bldg. Corporation v. Hamilton, 340 I1. 284, 172 N.E. 710 (1930);
Bauernschmidt v. Standard Oil Co., 153 Md. 647, 139 A. 531 (1927); O'Brien
v. Turner, 255 Mass. 84, 150 N.E. 886 (1926); Cohen v. Rosevale Realty Co.,
121 Misc. 618, 202 N.Y.S. 95, (Sup. Ct. 1923); White v. Old York Road Country
Club, 318 Pa. 346, 178 A. 3 (1936). But see Appeal of Beard, 64 Conn. 526,
30 A. 775 (1894), for a discussion of Conn. Pub. Acts of 1893, Chap. 175, giv-
ing the right of appeal to every property owner in a town where a county com-
missioner grants a license to sell liquor and based on the idea that ". . . every
property owner in town has a substantial interest in prosperity and good order of
the town.... ." and is therefore aggrieved by such a decision.
9. A finding of special damages must be made and this finding should be a
matter for ad hoc determination by the court of record; see 2 A. RATHKOPF, THE
LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING 63-16 (1966).
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CASE COMMENTS
Obviously, a party having an interest in land'0 who is being prevented
by a zoning decision from making a desired use of such land is "...
personally and specially affected in a way different from that suffered
by the public generally.""' The difficulty arises when a decision is
made permitting a landowner to use his land in a manner which other
persons find objectionable. In this type of case, the alleged special
damages must be critically analyzed by the court to determine whether
the petitioner has the requisite standing to challenge the zoning regu-
lation.- In some of these cases,' 3 courts have held that reasonably
close proximity to the zoned property is sufficient to establish an ad-
verse effect. On this basis, without further proof, plaintiffs have sus-
tained the burden of proof on the aggrieved party issue. Other courts
have adopted the converse of this position, and have held that with-
out an allegation of close proximity a party is not aggrieved and can-
not be granted the relief demanded.14 These courts have evidently
overlooked the meaning of a proximity allegation.
In Blumberg v. Hill 5 plaintiff owned property in a residential dis-
trict, one mile from defendant's property. Defendant was granted a
permit, by an administrative ruling, for the building of a guest house.
In denying plaintiff's prayer for injunction, the court declared:
One who is merely in the class of a resident-owner of zoned prop-
erty in and a tax payer of the municipality and whose only in-
terest is to have strict enforcement of zoning regulations for the
general welfare of the community.., is not an aggrieved person.
... As one may not assume the role of champion of the community
to challenge public officers to meet him in courts of justice to de-
fend their official acts, so one having only a general interest may
10. For the purpose of this article the type of interest necessary is unimportant.
11. DuBay v. Crane, 240 Md. 180, 213 A.2d 487 (1965).
12. See, e.g., Marcus v. Montgomery County Council, 235 Md. 535, 201 A.2d
777 (1964), cited in Joseph, where petitioners alleged that traffic and school popu-
lation would be increased as a result of recent rezoning. Held: Such inconveniences
were likely to be suffered by any member of the general public and that, therefore,
petitioners suffered no special damages. The Joseph court, however misconstrued
this case as holding that traffic increases can never constitute special damages. It
merely supports the principle that one does not suffer special damages if his loss
is identical to that suffered by the general public.
13. See, e.g., Elwyn v. City of Miami, 113 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1956); Hernreich
v. Quinn, 350 Mo. 753, 168 S.W.2d 1054 (1943).
14. Malena v. Commerdinger, 233 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Balsam v.
Jagger, 231 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
15. 119 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
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not adopt the part of an advocate of municipal welfare to proceed
against a zoning board of appeals to procure a judicial enforce-
ment or interpretation of zoning regulations.-6
The court found on the evidence that plaintiff had only a "general
interest" in the strict enforcement of zoning regulations.17 From this
type of case it can be argued that the distance between plaintiff's prop-
erty and the rezoned property is significant only when the plaintiff
is attempting to show that the damages alleged are suffered in conse-
quence of such proximity and are peculiar to him for this reason. It
is only in this type of case that close proximity should be the determi-
native factor in establishing that the plaintiff is genuinely aggrieved
and not merely "assuming the role of public champion." Proximity
should not be a requirement for special damage in every case.18
A distinction must also be taken between what is required to appeal
to a court and what is required for the granting of the relief demanded
on appeal. In Tata v. Township of Babylon,29 plaintiffs were located
in the "immediate vicinity" of a rezoned parcel, and alleged immi-
nent pecuniary loss and a "drastic aesthetic upheaval" due to the re-
zoning.20 Defendants moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
the complaint lacked proper allegations of special damage necessary
to confer standing to appeal. The court recognized that:
[t]he question does not go to the quantum of damages at this
point, but rather to their existence per se. . . . [A]ssuming the
pleading is accepted, plaintiff's evidence of loss is then closely
scrutinized .... 21
16. Id. at 857.
17. See also Marcus v. Busch, 1 Mich. App. 134, 134 N.W.2d 498 (1965),
cited in Joseph, where a zoning board granted a use variance to allow defendant
to erect an office building in a zone prohibiting such use. The court found no
proof that plaintiffs were property owners nor that they had suffered any damage
whatsoever. Plaintiffs therefore had no standing as aggrieved parties to challenge
the board's action.
18. See Crozier v. County Comm'rs of Prince George's County, 202 Md. 501,
97 A.2d 296 (1953), where petitioner was located "within the immediate neigh-
borhood" of property rezoned from 2-family homes to apartment houses and de-
preciation in value of property, inter alia, was alleged. The court did not concern
itself with the importance of proximity, but, rather, decided the case on the
existence of special injury to petitioner-i.e., damages and deprecation of the land.
See also, Weinberg v. Kracke, 189 Md. 275, 55 A.2d 797 (1947); Tyler v. Bd.
of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 145 A.2d 832 (1958).
19. 52 Misc. 2d 667, 276 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
20. Id. at 668, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 427.
21. Id. at 669, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
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The court then held that the recited special damages were adequate
to give standing to sue but not to prevail. This distinction cannot be
overemphasized, since the fact that one is aggrieved does not in itself
entitle him to prevail in his action to strike down the zoning regula-
tion. Relief will be granted only if the court can find the action of
the legislative or administrative body an abuse of "discretion," "arbi-
trary," "capricious," or "contrary to law."22 The Joseph decision must
be analyzed against this background.
II. LossEs NOT BASED ON PROXIMITY
The Joseph court held that economic and aesthetic losses resulting
from an increase in traffic, with its incidental difficulties, were matters
for police authorities and could not be considered special damages.
In support of this proposition, the court cited Victoria Corp. v. Atlanta
Merchandise Mart, Inc.2 3 In Victoria, defendant had been granted a
use variance. Plaintiff's only objection to the issuance of a building
permit was ". . . the increased traffic and congestion on the streets
which would be generated or induced by the presence of such a build-
ing."U The court held that "... [s]uch increase in traffic congestion
and attendant difficulties in finding parking places are matters which
address themselves to the police authorities of the municipality rather
than to the zoning authorities."25 Plaintiff, in this case, was a corpora-
tion conducting business in a building located one-half mile from the
proposed new use. Plaintiff did not allege economic and aesthetic
loss caused by traffic increases, but only that increased traffic conges-
tion would generate parking difficulties in front of its building. Police
measures might alleviate inconvenience in the second kind of case, but
they cannot eliminate the damage suffered by plaintiff in the Joseph
case if such damage does in fact exist.
That damage due to such economic and aesthetic loss may amount
to special damages and thus possibly form the basis for relief is indi-
cated by 222 East Chestnut Street Corp. v. Board of Appeals.2 Plain-
tiff's apartment building was located across the street from property
which was granted a special use allowing construction of a parking lot.
Plaintiff, objecting to the permit, alleged that the proposed structure
22. See generally 2 A. RATrOpF, supra note 9, at 65-1.
23. 101 Ga. App. 163, 112 S.E.2d 793 (1960).
24. Id. at 164, 112 S.E.2d at 794.
25. Id. at 165, 112 S.E.2d at 795.
26. 14 Ill. 2d 190, 152 N.E.2d 465 (1958).
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would ". . . interfere with its light and air, congest traffic in the street,
and reduce the value of its property." 27 The granting of the permit
was affirmed in the circuit court, and upon appeal the Illinois Supreme
Court looked into plaintiff's claim of special injury and damage to
determine whether plaintiff had standing to maintain the suit. Plain-
tiff had asked the court
... to take judicial notice, first, that the fumes, noise and dust
from, the cars using the parking lot] contemplated by [tenants
of plaintiff's building] would in fact cause such injury as to render
plaintiff's apartments less desirable and, second, that their effect
will extend to a depreciation of the rental and sales value of
plaintiff's property."8
The court admitted the possibilty of special damages of such a na-
ture but denied relief to plaintiff since ". . . such elements of special
damage are matters of affirmative proof, not judicial notice ... [and]
... that special injury in the respect claimed [cannot] be assumed...
in this case."29
III. CONCLUSION
The Joseph decision raises the question of when proximity to the
rezoned property is essential to a finding that a neighbor challenging
the rezoning has standing to appeal. To date, most courts have relied
on a finding of proximity as the basis for conferring standing, although
the reasoning which underlies these decisions is not clear. This analy-
sis of the Joseph case has suggested that proximity need not be the
only basis for conferring standing when other factors indicate that a
litigant has a legitimate interest in a zoning controversy.
Another approach to the standing problem raised by the Joseph
decision is suggested in a comment by one zoning authority that nearly
half of all the reported zoning cases involve a conflict between resi-
dential and commercial uses on a travelled public highway. While
the courts have been ambivalent in according weight to traffic increases
in making decisions about zoning changes,30 the impact of a traffic
build-up on administrative and legislative attitudes toward zoning
27. 10 II. 2d 130, 131, 139 N.E.2d 221, 222 (1956).
28. 14 InI. at 193, 152 N.E.2d at 467.
29. Id; but see Circle Lounge and Grille v. Bd. of Appeals of Boston, 324 Mass.
427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949), where the court examined this causal relationship to
determine the existence of special damages. For cases holding that special damages
were made out by a showing of increases in traffic, see Stocksdale v. Barnard, 239
Md. 541, 212 A.2d 282 (1965); Richmark Realty Co., Inc. v. Whittlif, 226 Md.
273, 173 A.2d 196 (1961).




policy is too obvious to require documentation.31 Plaintiff's interven-
tion in Joseph may have been self-protective. He may have felt the
necessity to intervene at that point, rather than risk an accumulation
of zoning changes following the change allowed in that case. As a
consequence of such an accumulation of change, the use of his own
property may be affected. Because changes in the amount and flow of
traffic have a bearing on zoning policy, objecting neighbors might well
be allowed to challenge zoning decisions which bring about traffic
changes which might affect their own property. In such circumstances,
a court could well find the economic and aesthetic loss to property
value which plaintiff's petition alleged as having occurred in the
Joseph decision.
Harold L. Sarner
31. Wilson v. Borough of Mountainside, 42 N.J. 426, 201 A.2d 540 (1964).
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